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In Norton (1990), I presented evidence that changing the reimbursement sys- 
tem to nursing homes to account for performance had a positive effect both on 
quality and on controlling costs. The analysis used a simple Markov model to 
estimate transition probabilities between states of health in the nursing home. 
A comparison of the probabilities for the control group (no incentives) and the 
experimental group (positive incentives) found them to be different. People in 
the experimental group stayed for a shorter time and had better outcomes. 
The simple Markov model maintains several strong assumptions. For ex- 
ample, it assumes that the transition probabilities are constant over time, in- 
dependent of past states, and the same for all people. If any of these assump- 
tions are false, the conclusions of  the previous paper may be ill founded. This 
paper extends the analysis to more general models and in doing so subjects 
the simple Markov model to a series of rigorous specification tests. Most of 
the specification tests are done on data from the control group nursing homes 
only so as not to mix effects of the experiment with those of the assumptions. 
Each section of the paper tests one of the assumptions listed below: 
1.  First  order. The probability of  being in  state j  next period depends only 
2.  Homogeneity. The probabilities are independent of  personal characteris- 
3.  Stutionarity. The probabilities are constant over time. 
on the current state, not on past states. 
tics, such as age, sex, race, and marital status. 
Edward C. Norton is a postdoctoral fellow in the Project on the Economics of Aging at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research and the Bradley Fellow at Harvard University Medical 
School, Department of Health Care Policy. 
The author wishes to thank Rebecca Demsetz, Jerry Hausman, Paul Joskow, Daniel McFadden, 
Carolyn H. Norton, Mitchell Petersen, James Poterba, Sherwin Rosen, Douglas Staiger, members 
of the Public Finance lunch, and the NBER Conference on the Economics of Aging for helpful 
comments. Grant support from the National Science Foundation and the Bradley Foundation is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
275 276  Edward C. Norton 
4. Duration  dependence. The probabilities are independent of  how  long a 
person has been in the nursing home. 
5. Learning  efect.  Nursing  homes  in  the  experimental  group  instantly 
switched to optimize under the new reimbursement system with no learn- 
ing period. 
6. Markov assumption. P(T)  = P(l)=. 
7. Measurement error Reporting errors by nurses have no effect on the esti- 
This paper contains a summary of  the experiment done by  the National 
Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR) and the data used in the anal- 
ysis. Then there is a brief review of the results in Norton (1990). The remain- 
der of the paper is a rigorous extension of the previous analysis. 
mated transition probabilities. 
9.1  Study and Data 
This section contains a brief summary of  the methodology of  the NCHSR 
experiment and a description of the data collected. For a more complete dis- 
cussion, see Weissert et al. (1983). 
Thirty-six proprietary, Medi-Cal certified, skilled nursing facilities in San 
Diego participated in the study. All these nursing homes had at least thirty 
beds. Only four eligible nursing homes in San Diego declined to participate. 
NCHSR hired Applied Management Sciences Inc. of  Silver Spring, Mary- 
land, to collect the data and to supervise the team of registered nurses that did 
the fieldwork. After a six-month baseline data-gathering period, the nursing 
homes were split from a matched sample into two groups of  eighteen. The 
experimental group received all three incentive payments, while the control 
group was paid only a nominal amount to cover the additional cost of book- 
keeping. A total of  11,389 residents were tracked during the two-and-a-half- 
year study. Out of these residents, 58 percent were covered by Medicaid, and 
the incentives applied only to these people. Table 9.1 shows a time line of 
how the study was conducted, and table 9.2 gives summary statistics about 
the data. 
9.1.1  Resident Classification System 
The hired registered nurses visited each resident periodically to assess their 
health and to determine whether they achieved certain goals. New residents 
were assessed within two weeks of admission, and most reassessments were 
made at three-month intervals. When a person left a nursing home, the date 
and reason were recorded. Nurses classified residents as being in one of five 
states of health.  Classification depended primarily on how  much help was 
needed in  activities of  daily living (ADL). These objective measures have 
been used widely as the best measure of health status of the elderly (see Katz 
and Akpom 1976; and Borsch-Supan, Kotlikoff, and Morris 1988). There are 
six ADLs: bathing, dressing, eating, using the toilet, transferring, and walk- 277  Markov Specification Tests 
Table 9.1  Time Line 
November 1980 to April 1981 
30 April 1981 
May  1981 to April 1982 
30 April 1982 
May 1982 to April 1983 
Collected baseline data, no incentives 
Homes randomly assigned to experimental or control 
New admissions eligible for admission incentives for one 
End of study if admitted prior to May 1981 
Reassessed if admitted after 1 May 1981 
groups 
Ye= 
~~  ~~ 
Table 9.2  NCHSR Nursing Home Data 
Subgroup  Average Age  % Women  5%  White  % Married 
Admitted before study: 
Control (N=718)  80  70  90  15 
Experiment (N  =  637)  19  73  91  16 
Control (N= 1,417)  80  12  91  16 
Experiment (N= 1,080)  80  74  89  17 
Admitted during study: 
Table 9.3  Classification  of the Five States of Health 
Dischargeable 
within 90 
Type  days?  ADL Index 
% of Sample 
at Admission 
A  Yes  Usually ADL 5  2  23 
B  No  1 sADLs4  22 
C  No  ADL = 5  31 
D  No  ADL = 6  18 
E  No  ADL 2 4 and required special nursing  5 
services 
ing. A person who needs assistance in four of these categories has an ADL 
index of four. Classification also depended on how soon someone was likely 
to be discharged and whether special nursing care was needed. Type A people 
are the “healthiest” and type E the “sickest.” Table 9.3 summarizes the classi- 
fication scheme. 
9.1.2  Incentive Payments 
Admission 
Medicaid reimbursement in California was a flat prospective rate ($36 in 
1981), with the result that nursing homes were reluctant to admit people who 
required more than average care. Nursing homes in the experimental group 
received a per diem bonus when they admitted type D and E residents. The 278  Edward C. Norton 
size of  the bonuses reflected wages needed to pay for increased nursing care 
coverage. The per diem bonuses for types A, B, C, and D were 0, -2.5,  0, 
and  5, respectively. The rate for E ranged from 3 to 28, depending on the 
amount of special care needed. 
Outcome 
Some residents needed special rehabilitation to improve their functional or 
health status. This requires a large fixed cost to the nursing home that is not 
reimbursed under flat rate reimbursement and is therefore discouraged. Exper- 
imental group nursing homes received a lump sum bonus if selected residents 
improved their health status (corresponding to E + D, C +  B or D +  B, and 
B -+ A). These goals were designed to reduce ADL dependence and eliminate 
the need for special nursing services. Nursing homes were paid only if the 
goal was met within ninety days. It is important to remember that, in order to 
be eligible for a goal, a resident first had to be nominated by  his or her nursing 
home. Nursing homes nominated residents whom they felt would benefit from 
costly rehabilitation services, and the hired NCHSR nurses had to approve 
each nomination. In the experimental group nursing homes, 150 nominations 
were approved. The hired nurses nominated residents in the control group 
nursing homes. Nursing homes received an amount equal to the estimated 
wages needed to pay for extra nursing help, ranging from $126 to $370. 
Discharge 
People well enough to be discharged are also the least expensive to care for. 
Nursing homes prefer to keep these people, although they cannot legally pre- 
vent  anyone  from  leaving.  To  encourage  appropriate discharges,  nursing 
homes received a lump sum bonus if  certain residents were discharged from 
the nursing home promptly and the resident stayed out of  the nursing home 
for ninety days. Payment was designed to offset the cost of a vacant bed and 
the administrative costs of discharge. Type A residents were not eligible for 
discharge bonuses since they were expected to be discharged soon anyway. 
Payment ranged from $230 down to $60, with more paid for a timelier dis- 
charge. Like outcome incentives, experimental group nursing homes had to 
nominate residents and have their choices approved (1  13 were approved). 
9.2  Markov Model 
An  implicit assumption in the NCHSR experiment is that the way nursing 
homes are paid affects their effort, which in turn affects residents’ health. This 
section briefly describes a model of how reimbursement affects health. A first- 
order Markov model is described completely by  a set of  probabilities (see 
Amemiya 1985, chap. 11). Let P, be the probability that a person goes from 
state i to state j in one period. There are nine states in the model, five states of 279  Markov Specification Tests 
health within in the nursing home and four states to go to outside the nursing 
home. State of  health is based on an objective index of  a person’s ability to 
perform basic tasks of living, known as the Activities of Daily Living Index.’ 
When residents leave a nursing home, their state of health determines where 
they go next: home, intermediate care facility, hospital, or death. Although 
health is a random variable, it does not depend solely on biology but depends 
also on the nursing home’s effort, e, which in turn is a function of the reim- 
bursement system, I. Let P,] = P[e(I)],J.  Presumably, larger incentives trigger 
greater effort and better health. 
A simple test of the plan’s effectiveness is to estimate P  for both the control 
and  the  experimental groups and  to  compare the transition matrices. One 
would expect that,  if the program is effective, the probability of  improving 
one’s health will be greater in the experimental group nursing homes. Also, 
using the Markov model allows one to compare estimates of the length and 
cost per spell in the nursing home. If the results show no differences between 
the groups, it could be because the incentives were too small to induce much 
more effort. It could also be that increased effort from the current level would 
not change a resident’s fortunes, and it would therefore not be worthwhile to 
increase effort. 
The P  matrices were estimated by  maximum likelihood. Estimation con- 
trolled for censored observations and the fact that the time between observa- 
tions was not constant. The transition probabilities were estimated for a two- 
week time period. 
The results can be summarized as follows. Incentive regulation of nursing 
homes had beneficial effects on both quality and cost of care. People in exper- 
imental group nursing homes were more likely to go home or to a lower-level 
nursing home and less likely to be hospitalized or to die than people in control 
group nursing homes. The admission incentives induced nursing homes to 
admit more people with severe disabilities. The most striking difference be- 
tween the experimental and the control groups is that both the mean and the 
median length of stay are much shorter in the experimental group. The incen- 
tives do seem to cause the nursing homes to discharge residents more quickly. 
Were  this program implemented, the cost savings would not come directly 
from shorter stays since high occupancy rates mean a nearly constant Medi- 
caid population in nursing homes. Instead, the more rapid turnover rate would 
transfer patients out of  hospitals and save hospital costs. The administrative 
and incentive costs of  the NCHSR program are negligible compared to the 
potential savings. 
1. There are five categories in this study based on the six ADLs (eating, bathing, transferring 
into and out of bed, using the toilet, walking, and dressing). ADLs are good determinants of 
ability to function alone (see Katz and Akpom  1976). The five categories are described in section 
9.3. 280  Edward C. Norton 
9.3  First Order versus Second Order 
The assumption that the Markov model is first order means that the transi- 
tion probabilities depend only on current health. Any information from the 
past should not help predict the future. A more general model would incor- 
porate information about whether a person has been improving, has been get- 
ting worse, or has remained stable. The first-order assumption can be tested 
against the alternative that the model is second order. If the model is second 
order, then the probabilities depend on both health now and health last period. 
A second-order model can be written as a first-order model with many more 
initial states. Specifically for the nursing home data, the first-order model has 
five possible states of  health and the second-order model thirty. More pre- 
cisely, let P,Jk  be the probability that a person will be type k next period, given 
that he or she is type j now and was type i last period. The index j ranges over 
the five categories A-E.  The indices i and k  range over those five and also the 
state of  being out of  the nursing home. If  the model is first order, then the 
following probabilities in the second-order model should be the same: 
PAjk  = P,,  = P,  = P,  = P,  = P,  tl  j,  k. 
Anderson and Goodman (1957) give a test for the null hypothesis that a 
model is first order against the alternative that it is second order. The test uses 
probability estimates from the expanded second-order matrix. Stationarity and 
homogeneity are maintained hypotheses. Anderson and Goodman show that 
the likelihood ratio criterion for testing the null hypothesis for a current state 
j is 
where  n,  =  nVk,  nijk = the  number of  observed  transitions i +  j  -+  k, 
k1  Pijk = nijkln,,  and Pjk = cnijJcnijk. 
I  i.k 
The tests use data from the control group nursing homes for all people ad- 
mitted during either the study or the baseline periods. The four absorbing 
states outside the nursing home were combined into a single state, GONE.  This 
is different than having not yet entered the nursing home. The rows marked 
“0’  in table 9.4 indicate out of  nursing home prior to admission. These are 
the people who are currently in the nursing home but who had not yet been 
admitted last period. Only people who were observed at least twice were in- 
cluded.* 
For this test, the model assumes that the time between observations is al- 
ways three months.  In  fact,  87  percent of  all observations occurred three 
2. Leaving the nursing home (GONE) counted as being observed, but being right censored did 
not. 281  Markov Specification Tests 
Table 9.4  Test of First Order versus Second Order 
~  ~~ 
Future State 


















































































































































































































































































































Nore: Numbers are probabilities. The elements on the main diagonal that are the largest in their 
column (if the number of  observations in the row 2  20) are set in italic. 282  Edward C. Norton 
months after the previous observations.  Furthermore,  89 percent  of all first 
assessments  were  taken  within  three  months  of  admission.  Finally,  most 
people who left a nursing home did so within three months of their last assess- 
ment. The few observations that did not fit were left in the analysis. I decided 
that it was better to include observations with timing problems than to use 
only a partial history for some people. The results are robust against leaving 
these observations out of the sample. 
Surprisingly, going from a first- to a second-order model simplifies the issue 
of  timing.  A large fraction of observations are over a short time interval be- 
cause  they  are of  transitions  between  admission  and  first assessment.  The 
second-order model conditions first on the current state, then on the past state. 
The exact time between admission and the first assessment is not important, 
as long as it is less than three months. In contrast, the first-order model con- 
ditions only on the current state. Parameter estimates would be biased if either 
observations from admission to a first assessment were left out or if  it were 
assumed that the time interval was exactly three months. 
The results of the chi-squared tests are shown in table 9.5A both by group 
and overall. The null hypothesis is soundly rejected, not only overall, but also 
group  by  group. Therefore, a person’s  recent  history  affects the transition 
probabilities. It is possible that the model is of a higher order than second, but 
there are not enough data to test this. 
We  can learn  more  by  looking  at  the  estimated  second-order  transition 
matrix in table 9.4 An interesting pattern can be seen in the blocks of Po!. The 
elements  on  each  block’s  main  diagonal  are particularly  large  relative  to 
the other numbers in their column (when n,)  2  20, with one exception). If the 
first-order assumption were true, then the probabilities in each column (for a 
given block) would all be about the same.  In other words, a person  who is 
Table 9.5  Test of First Order versus Second Order 
A. Test of  Null Hypothesis That Model Is First Order 
A  x2 =  66.08  rejects null at .oooO14  level 
B  x2 = 137.40  rejects null at .000000 level 
C  x2 = 109.10  rejects null at ,000000 level 
D  x2  =  68.81  rejects null at ,000006  level 
E  x2 =  77.64  rejects null at ,000000 level 
Total  x2  = 459.03  rejects null at .000OOO level 
B. Renormalized Test of Null Hypothesis That Model Is First Order 
A  xz =  29.59  rejects null at .24  level 
B  x2 =  39.78  rejects null at .031  level 
C  x2 =  48.92  rejects null at ,0029  level 
D  x2 =  37.21  rejects null at .055  level 
E  xz =  60.96  rejects null at ,000077 level 
Total  xz = 216.46  rejects null at .000000 level 283  Markov Specification Tests 
now type J would be type k next period with a probability that is independent 
of last period’s state. However, the pattern in this table shows that, if a person 
is type j now, the probability that she will become type k next period increases 
if  we  also know that she was type k last period. Of  course, people are still 
most likely to stay in the state they are in, and if they change states, they are 
most likely to go the adjacent state. This pattern can also be expressed as 
Pr(k future I j now) < Pr(k future I j now, k before). 
The chi-squared test can be taken one step further to see whether it still 
rejects when controlling for the effect outlined above. To do this, renormalize 
the numbers in table 9.4 so that the k -j -  k pattern is eliminated but all 
other features of the data are preserved. If  the test on renormalized data does 
not reject, then this is the only interesting pattern to be found. The matrix in 
table 9.6 is a renormalized version of table 9.4, and each block has the follow- 
ing properties: 
1. The weighted average of any column equals the element on the main di- 
agonal. 
2.  Each row sum is one. 
3. By  construction, the main diagonal terms contribute nothing to the like- 
lihood ratio test. 
Nonetheless, the results of  the renormalized chi-squared test indicate that 
more than half the variation in the original test is due to the fact that people 
tend to return to their previous state (see table 9.5B). Although three of  the 
group tests still reject,  it is clear that the k -j -  k pattern is the primary 
reason that the original first-order test rejected. 
The test of first order against the alternative of second order was thoroughly 
rejected, which implies that past information is important for predicting the 
future health of  nursing home residents. In  addition, investigating the num- 
bers highlighted the surprising fact that people who get worse in one period 
do not continue to decline but instead tend to rebound to their former state. A 
second-order model has the advantage of being more general but the disadvan- 
tage of being large to the point of being unwieldy. Furthermore, the rebound- 
ing effect has been noticed in other studies of  longitudinal data and found to 
be an artifact of measurement error (see Poterba and Summers 1986). This 
possibility is explored below. 
9.4  Homogeneity 
Although nursing homes admit people from widely varying backgrounds, 
the simple Markov model does not control for heterogeneity. As a first cut, it 
is far simpler to assume that transition probabilities are constant. However, 
preliminary work showed that Markov matrices for subgroups chosen by  age, 
sex, and marital status differ significantly. This section tests for heterogeneity 284  Edward C. Norton 
Table 9.6  Test of First Order versus Second Order 
Future State 


















































































































































































































































































































Note:  Numbers are probabilities. 285  Markov Specification Tests 
in two different ways, both of  which control for the three characteristics out- 
lined above and also for race. The first method adds terms to each cell of the 
Markov matrix, and the second is an ordered logit model. 
The obvious correction for heterogeneity is to add parameters to each cell 
in the transition matrix. The transition probabilities then depend on a constant 
and on personal characteristics (X includes age, sex, race, marital status): 
P,, = exp(Pv + XY) 
= exp(p,, + Y,AGE + Y,SEX  + Y~RACE  + Y~MARRIED) 
= eXp(~,)eXp(y,AGE)eXp(y,sEx)eXp(~3RACE)eXp(~4MAR~ED). 
Notice that the effects are assumed to be multiplicative, not additive. If a char- 
acteristic has  no  effect,  then  its  corresponding y,  should  be  zero;  thus, 
exp(y8 = 1.  AGE is defined to be true age minus eighty, divided by  ten.3 
The other characteristics are dummy variables: SEX equals one if male, RACE 
equals one if  nonwhite, and MARRIED (marital status) equals one if  currently 
married. 
Unfortunately, there are too few observations in  most cells to be able to 
parameterize fully. Instead, the matrix was reduced to five rows by  five col- 
umns by  combining states. Also,  some parameters were constrained to be 
equal across cells. Table 9.7 depicts how this was done. A Greek letter (except 
p) denotes a four-element vector of  parameters. There were only four param- 
eters per characteristic, far fewer than one per cell. Note that the main diago- 
nal equals one minus the row sum, and two cells have only constants. 
The results are shown in tables 9.8 and 9.9. Only AGE and SEX have signif- 
icant coefficients, so it appears that heterogeneity is quite weak. Looking at 
probability matrices for different types of  people, we  see a few interesting 
patterns. Older people are less likely to go home, as are women. Nonwhites 
are the least likely to die or go to a hospital, while married people are the most 
likely. 
Another way to check for heterogeneity is to run an ordered logit m0de1.~ 
This has the advantage of controlling for many individual characteristics, but 
it does not have the special timing structure of  the Markov model. One or- 
dered logit was run for each of the five states of health in the nursing home. 
The dependent variable was the set of possible outcomes (collapsed from nine 
states into only five; see table 9.10). The outcomes were ranked; worse out- 
comes, like death, had a higher number. 
The a’s reported in table 9.11 are the cutoff values for the different cate- 
gories. They are strictly monotonic, with higher thresholds for worse states of 
health. Thus, people who are type A have the highest a’s and are the least 
likely to go to a bad state. This is consistent with the results of the Markov 
model. 
3. Eighty was chosen because it is the average age of  a nursing home resident. 
4.  For an explanation of ordered logit models, see Maddala (1983). 286  Edward C.  Norton 
Table 9.7  Parameterization for Test for Homogeneity 
Home & ICF  1  0  0  0  0 
Hosp. & Death  0  1  0  0  0 
A  exp(P,, +XP)  exp(P,,+Xy)  (1 -row  sum)  exp(P,,+XO)  exp(P,,) 
B, C  exp(P2,  +XP)  exp(P2,  +Xv)  exp(P,, +X6)  (1 -row  sum)  exp(P,  +XO) 
D, E  exp(P,, +XP) exp(P,, +XY)  exp(P,,)  exp(P,  +X6)  (1  -row  sum) 
Nore: ICF = intermediate care facility. Hosp.  = hospitalization. 
Table 9.8  Test of Homogeneity: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Parameters 
for Three-Month Matrix with Heterogeneity Correction 
Parameter  From  To  Coefficient  SD 
PI1  A  Home, ICF  -  2.46  .19 
PI,  A  B, C  -  1.16  .I1 
PI2  A  Hosp., Death  -2.87  .23 
PI4  A  D, E  -3.90  .46 
P21  B, C  Home, ICF  -  4.22  .I8 
P22  B, C  Hosp., Death  -  3.09  .I1 
P23  B, C  A  -  3.26  .I3 
P24  B, C  D, E  -3.11  .I2 
P3l  D,  E  Home, ICF  -4.32  .35 
P32  D, E  Hosp., Death  -2.29  .13 
P34  D, E  B, C  -  1.43  .10 
P33  D, W  A  -5.14  .63 
I*, AGE  A-E  Home, ICF  -  ,332  ,067 
YI  AGE  A-E  Hosp., Death  -  .003  ,069 
6, AGE  B-E  Better in NH  -  .048  ,074 
8, AGE  A-D  Worse in NH  ,137  ,072 
Pz  SEX  A-E  Home, ICF  .52  .23 
Y2 SEX  A-E  Hosp., Death  .34  .17 
6, SEX  B-E  Better in NH  .04  .I9 
o2  SEX  A-D  Worse in NH  .08  .I9 
p,  RACE  A-E  Home, ICF  .16  .35 
y3  RACE  A-E  Hosp., Death  -  .41  .28 
6, RACE  B-E  Better in NH  -.I9  .27 
8, RACE  A-D  Worse in NH  -  .09  .32 
P4  MARRIED  A-E  Home, ICF  .13  .31 
6,  MARRIED  B-E  Better in NH  -  .03  .23 
8,  MARRIED  A-D  Worse in NH  .I4  .29 
No. of transitions = 2,512 
-Log  (likelihood) = 1,983.05 
y4  MARRIED  A-E  Hosp., Death  .37  .20 
Note: Sample is all people in  control group nursing homes admitted after 1 May  1981. AGE  = 
(true age - 80)ilO.  SEX  = 1 if  male, 0 else. RACE  = 1 if  nonwhite, 0 else.  MARRIRED 1 if 
married now, 0 else. Hosp.  = hospitalization. ICF = intermediate care facility. NH  = nursing 
home. 287  Markov Specification Tests 
Table 9.9  Test of Homogeneity: Estimated Three-Month  Markov 
'kansition Matrix 
Next Period 
This Period  Home, ICF  Hosp., Death  A  B, C  D, E 
Base case: 80-Year-Old Single White Woman 
A  8.5  5.7  52.3  31.5  2.0 
B, C  1.5  4.6  3.8  85.6  4.5 
D, E  1.3  10.2  .6  23.8  64.1 
AGE: 90-Year-Old Single White Woman 
A  6.1  5.7  56.2  30.0  2.0 
B, C  1.1  4.5  3.7  85.6  5.1 
D, E  0.9  10.1  .6  27.4  41 .O 
SEX: 80-Year-Old Single White Man 
~  ~~~ 
A  14.3  8.0  42.9  32.8  2.0 
B,  C  2.5  6.4  4.0  82.3  4.8 
D, E  2.2  14.3  .6  25.7  57.2 
RACE: 80-Year-Old Single Nonwhite Woman 
A  10.0  3.8  58.2  26.0  2.0 
B, C  1.7  3.0  3.2  88.0  4.1 
D, E  1.6  6.8  .6  21.7  69.3 
MARRIED: 80-Year-Old Manied White Woman 
A  9.7  8.2  49.4  30.7  2.0 
B, C  1.7  6.6  3.7  82.9  5.1 
D, E  1.5  14.8  .6  27.4  55.1 
~~~~~ 
Nore: ICF = intermediate care facility. Hosp. = hospitalization. 
Table 9.10  Ordered Logit Test for Homogeneity 
States 
Go home, or go to ICF 
Get better, but stay in NH' 
Stay the same 
Get worse but stay in NHb 
Go to hospital or die 
Nore: ICF = intermediate care facility. NH  = nursing home. 
'Does  not apply to state A. 
bDoes not apply to state E. 288  Edward C.  Norton 
Table 9.11  Test of Homogeneity: Results of Ordered Logit Models 







NH type (treat- 
ment = 1) 
AGE (true age) 
SEX (male = 1) 
RACE (IIOn- 
white =  1) 
ried= l) 














-  ,0145 
(.0021) 
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1.72 
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-  2.64 
(.39) 
-  .01 
.49 
(  .39) 
-  ,543 














-  ,029 
~14) 











-  .0009 
(.012) 
-  .82 
(.28) 
.so 






779  1,737  2,241  996  370 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. NH = nursing home. 
aDummy  cutoff variables. 
The coefficients for personal characteristics vary greatly in their effect. For 
example,  a positive coefficient on  AGE’  means that older people are more 
likely to be less healthy at their next assessment. SEX  and RACE seem to have 
no effect. AGE and MARRIED have significant and positive coefficients in three 
models. However, by  far the most significant coefficients are those for TIME 
(since admission) and  TIME^. Although it would be nice to be able to control 
for age and marital status in the Markov model, the coefficients for TIME since 
admission (and TIME*) suggest that duration should be an essential part of any 
model of transitions in and out of nursing homes. 
The conclusion seems to be that personal characteristics have only weak 
effects on the transition probabilities, particularly race. including extra pa- 
rameters slows down the computation substantially. The benefits of  control- 
5. In this test, AGE equals true age. 289  Markov Specification Tests 
ling for heterogeneity in a Markov model do not outweigh this cost. Other 
aspects of these data are more important to model. 
9.5  Stationarity 
The simple Markov model assumes that the probabilities are constant over 
time. Time can be measured on both a “relative” and an “absolute” scale, and 
the simple model requires that the probabilities are constant for both. Here, 
the relative scale measures time since admission. Stationarity on a relative 
scale refers to the assumption that the transition probabilities are independent 
of  the length of  time a person has been in the nursing home. The absolute 
scale refers to calendar time. In this case, stationarity means that there is no 
general trend over time. For example, all nursing homes are assumed to have 
adjusted instantly to the new system at the start of the experiment. 
Since the  stationarity assumption could fail in two different ways, it is 
tested in two different ways. The tests of  stationarity, implications of failure, 
and corrections to the model are different for each method. The following 
section tests for duration dependence in a parametric duration model, and the 
one following tests whether the transition matrices for the experimental group 
change over the study period. 
9.6  Duration Dependence 
The simple Markov model assumes that transition probabilities are inde- 
pendent of  how long a person has been  in a nursing home. There are two 
reasons why this assumption may be false. Cumulative time spent living in a 
nursing home may affect probabilities directly. For instance, the initial move 
into a nursing home may be an unpleasant shock that fades as a person makes 
new friends and grows accustomed to the new surroundings. The second rea- 
son is that unobserved (or uncontrolled for) heterogeneity will cause duration 
dependence. Heckman and Singer (1984, p. 78) give the following explana- 
tion: “Intuitively, more mobility prone persons are the first to leave the popu- 
lation  leaving  the  less  mobile  behind  and  hence  creating the  illusion  of 
stronger negative duration dependence than actually exists .” 
Heckman and Singer go on to explain that ignoring heterogeneity will cause 
bias toward more negative duration dependence. It would therefore be incor- 
rect to test for duration dependence without trying to control for heterogene- 
ity. The two tests in this section control for the four observed characteristics: 
age, sex, race, and marital status. If the test rejects the hypothesis of no dura- 
tion dependence, it could be due either to real duration dependence or to unob- 
servable characteristics. 
The first test treats time in the nursing home like another personal charac- 
teristic. A variable for time since admission is added to each cell. As  before, 
a five by five matrix is used to estimate the three-month transition probabili- 290  Edward C. Norton 
ties. In addition to time, both age and sex were used as explanatory variables 
(race and marital status were shown to be less important by the heterogeneity 
tests in sec. 9.1). The null hypothesis is rejected if the parameters for time are 
significantly different than zero. 
The effects of  time in this model are insignificant, as shown in table 9.12. 
Not  one parameter differed significantly from zero. Not  surprisingly, the pa- 
rameters for age and sex were very close to values estimated in the section on 
heterogeneity. Thus, it does not seem necessary to control for duration depen- 
dence in this model. 
The second test for duration dependence is a standard parametric duration 
model, the Weibull model,  which measures both duration dependence and 
Table 9.12  Test of Duration Dependence: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of 
Parameters for Three-Month  Matrix with The  Heterogeneity 
Correction 
Parameter  From  To  Coefficient  SD 
PI1  A 
PI2  A 
PI3  A 
PI,  A 
P21  B, C 
Pa  8,  C 
P23  B, C 
P,  B, C 
$31  D, E 
P32  D, E 
P33  D, E 
P,  D, E 
PI  AGE  A-E 
YI  AGE  A-E 
6, AGE  B-E 
0, AGE  A-D 
cL.2 SEX  A-E 
Y2 SEX  A-E 
6, SEX  B-E 
oz SEX  A-D 
k3  TIME  A-E 
Y, TIME  A-E 
6, TIME  B-E 
0, TIME  A-D 
No. of  transition = 2,512 















Better in NH 
Worse in NH 
Home, ICF 
Hosp., Death 
Better in NH 
Worse in NH 
Home, ICF 
Hosp., Death 
Better in NH 
Worse in NH 
-  2.38 
-  2.88 









-  1.49 
-  ,345 
-  ,023 




-  .02 
.05 
-  ,049 
-.011 
-  .022 

























Note: Sample is all people in control group nursing homes admitted after  1 May 1981. AGE  = 
(true age -  80)/10. SEX  = 1 if male, 0 else. TIME = time since admission. ICF = intermediate 
care facility. Hosp.  = hospitalization. NH  = nursing home. 291  Markov Specification Tests 
Table 9.13  Test of Duration Dependence: Weibull Model 
Duration 
Controll  Type at  Parameter  CONSTANT  AGE  MALE  NONWHITE  MARRIED 



















































-  3.46 
-4.45 
(.  34) 
-4.90 
(.  24) 
~27) 















-  ,137 
(.072) 
-  ,006 
(.066) 




-  ,336 
Note:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  AGE  = (true age-80)/10.  SEX  = 1 if mde, eke 0. RACE 
= 1 if nonwhite, else 0. MARRIED  = 1 if married now, else 0. TIME = days. 
heterogeneity. This test sacrifices many aspects of the Markov model, but it 
has the advantage of being easy to compute. The Weibull model has only two 
states: a person is either in or out of  a nursing home. Because duration de- 
pends on a person's health, and because health usually remains constant, all 
residents were grouped according to their health at admission (types A-E). 
Also, because the model was estimated on both the control and experimental 
samples, this provides confirmation that the average length of stay was shorter 
in the experimental group. 
The hazard function for the Weibull model depends on time-invariant char- 
acteristics X and a duration parameter a: 
h(t(X)  = cxt"-'exp(Xp) 
X includes a constant term and variables for age, sex, race, and marital status, 
as defined before. The parameter a  distinguishes the Weibull model from the 
exponential model, which has a constant hazard. If  a  is greater (less) than 
one, the model has positive (negative) duration dependence. 
The results from the Weibull model tests are shown in table 9.13. The most 
striking result is that the estimated duration parameter, (Y,  is significantly less 
than one in all cases. The models have negative duration dependence, which 292  Edward C. Norton 
means that the probability of  leaving the nursing home declines over time. 
Note that, for all types except E, & is greater in the experimental group than 
in the control, so duration dependence is  less pronounced in  experimental 
group nursing  homes.  However, the constant term for experimental group 
nursing homes is the same or more negative. This implies that, at admission, 
the hazard rate is no larger in the experimental group, but over time the hazard 
rate declines more slowly. This partially explains the shorter length of  stay 
found in Norton (  1990). 
Once again, the results on heterogeneity are mixed. Age and sex are signif- 
icant in about half the cases. Surprisingly, older people have lower hazard 
rates than younger, and men have higher hazard rates than. women. Only race 
is clearly insignificant. 
The results from the Markov and Weibull tests are quite different. When 
time terms were added to the Markov model, the results were insignificant. 
However, the Weibull model showed strong results that there is strong nega- 
tive duration dependence. It is not clear why time should be so much more 
significant in one model than the other. 
9.7  Learning Effect 
Whenever a new program is put into effect, it takes time for the participants 
to  adjust to  the  new  system.  Too  often,  though,  economists assume that 
people  adjust instantly and  perfectly at  the  start of  a  new  program.  The 
NCHSR nursing home experiment was a complicated system of  incentives 
and assessments. Although the nursing homes did have a six-month period in 
which  to learn  about the new  reimbursement system,  they  did  not  know 
whether they would be in the control or the experimental group until the day 
before the reimbursement system went into effect. This was good for experi- 
mental design in some ways, but it meant that nursing homes in the experi- 
mental group needed time to adjust. 
In a previous paper (Norton 1990), I found that the distribution of types of 
health at admission changed slowly from the beginning to the conclusion of 
the study. The nursing homes did not adjust immediately to the new admission 
incentives. If they also did not adjust promptly to the outcome and discharge 
incentives, then the test in the previous paper may be biased toward no effect. 
Suppose that the experimental group took a while to hire new nurses and set 
new  operational procedures.  Then the effects of  the experiment would not 
appear in the Markov transition matrix until after several months had passed. 
To  test whether there was a learning period, the data for the experimental 
group were split into two parts: those admitted during the first six months of 
the study and those admitted thereafter.6 Two-week transition matrices were 
6.  The background period lasted from 1 November 1980 to 30 April  1981. All thirty-six nursing 
homes were then divided randomly into one of two groups. Anyoneadmitted to  an  experimental 293  Markov Specification Tests 
estimated using the continuous time model for people admitted during each 
period. 
The results for the two groups are clearly different, as can be seen in tables 
9.14 and 9.15. The second group has a much shorter average length of  stay 
and  better outcomes in  general. In  particular, the probability of  dying de- 
creased, and the probability of going home increased, for almost all types. 
Therefore there is strong evidence that it took the nursing homes in the exper- 
imental group time to adjust, and the results in the previous paper may  be 
underestimated. 
9.8  Markov Assumption 
varied widely is to use the identity from Markov processes that 
The key step in correcting the problem that the times between observations 
P(T) = P(l)T, 
where P(T)  is the matrix of transition probabilities over T time periods. I call 
this  the  Markov  assumption.  This  allows  parameters from  the  transition 
matrix of  any time interval to be expressed in terms of the parameters of the 
shortest time interval. This assumption is false if the probabilities depend on 
anything other than a constant. If  the model is not first order and homoge- 
neous and stationary (in both senses), it will fail this test. Testing the Markov 
assumption is therefore a good summary test of specification error. 
On the other hand, the test is not valid if there is selection bias on the basis 
of  time interval. Here,  selection bias means that certain types of  transitions 
are oversampled (or undersampled) at particular frequencies because of  the 
way  in which the data were collected. For example, if  all transitions within 
the nursing home are observed at three-month intervals but people leave at 
random times, then there is selection bias. The estimated matrix for any time 
other than three months will have positive probabilities only for leaving. A 
test of the Markov assumption on this data would fail simply because of the 
selection bias. The nursing home data have this problem since almost all ob- 
servations over a short time period are of people entering or leaving a nursing 
home. Therefore, the test includes only transitions in the nursing home. 
The test of the Markov assumption compares transition matrices of different 
time periods @(T)  for different T).  Since the data for each matrix have the 
same time interval, estimation is easy. The continuous time correction is not 
needed, so an element P, = n,/z  n,.  The test uses control group nursing 
home data for periods of two, three, and four months. 
i 
group nursing home during the following year was eligible for three types of  incentives. Although 
residents were reassessed after 1 May 1982 and could earn bonuses for the nursing home, anyone 
admitted after that time was not eligible to earn bonuses. 294  Edward C. Norton 
Table 9.14  Test of Learning Effect: Early Part of Study 
Next Period 
Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death  A  B  C  D  E 
A  4.6  2.5  2.1  .6  83.5  6.1  .4  .2  .o 
B  .7  1.7  I .2  .5  .9  91.6  3.2  .2  .o 
C  .3  .2  1 .o  .9  .I  2.9  92.6  1.8  .2 
D  .I  .I  2.0  3.2  .I  .2  4.6  88.8  .9 
E  .o  .5  1.8  4.5  .o  .6  1.6  .7  90.3 
Length of  Stay 
Mean  Median 
A  16.6  8 
B  25.6  17 
C  30.0  22 
D  23.3  15 
E  18.5  11 
Probability That Person Starting in State Leaves 
Nursing Home in State 
Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death 
A  35  27  26  13 
B  17  30  31  21 
C  13  17  36  34 
D  7  10  36  48 
E  4  11  29  51 
Nore: ICF = intermcdiate care facility. Hosp. = hospitalization 
The estimated matrices show that the Markov assumption does not hold in 
the nursing home data (see table 9.16). The left-hand column has one-period 
matrices, which are not comparable. The right-hand column has these matri- 
ces raised to the sixth, fourth, and third powers; they are therefore comparable 
since the time interval is forty-eight weeks (almost one year). As  a general 
misspecification test, this confirms the results in the previous sections that the 
simple Markov model was misspecified. 
9.9  Measurement Error 
Poterba and Summers (1986) showed that even a small probability of  re- 
porting error can lead to large errors in duration estimates when using a Mar- 
kov model. They adjusted labor market transition probabilities using report- 
ing errors in the Census Population Survey. Reporting errors distort the true 295  Markov Specification Tests 
Table 9.15  Test of Learning Effect: Late Part of Study 
~~  ~~ 
Next Period 
This 
Period  Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death  A  B  C  D  E 
A  4.6  2.7  1.8  1.2  85.0  3.7  1.0  .o  .o 
B  .8  1.0  1.5  .7  3.2  88.7  3.3  .o  .8 
C  .3  .4  2.0  1.1  2.8  .8  92.4  .o  .2 
D  .2  2.5  2.5  3.1  .o  .O  1.1  90.4  .2 
E  .o  .o  3.9  2.9  .o  .O  1.5  3.4  88.3 
Length of  Stay 
(3 months) 
Mean  Median 
A  12.8  8 
B  19.5  14 
C  20.3  15 
D  13.1  9 
E  14.9  10 
Probability That Person Starting in State Leaves 
Nursing Home in State 
Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death 
A  38  24  23  14 
B  24  21  35  20 
C  21  17  40  23 
D  5  28  32  36 
E  4  10  48  38 
Nore: ICF = intermediate care facility. Hosp.  = hospitalization 
probabilities by overestimating the frequency of transitions between different 
states. A person who is unemployed for a long time and who misreports being 
employed makes it seem as if he has much shorter spells of unemployment. 
After adjusting for error rates of only 5 percent, Poterba and Summers found 
that  true spells of unemployment were  as much as 80 percent longer than 
conventional measures. 
The nursing  home data may be subject to a similar problem.  Nurses as- 
sessed each resident’s health periodically  according  to somewhat  subjective 
criteria. The decision was based primarily on a person’s activity of daily living 
(ADL) index. Although the ADL index was designed to be an objective mea- 
sure of disability in performing basic functions, in practice there is some sub- 
jectivity in assessing whether another person can do something satisfactorily. 
It is especially difficult to judge whether a person  is type A, which includes 
people  expected  to be sent home within  ninety  days, regardless  of  current 296  Edward C. Norton 
Table 9.16  Test of Markov Assumption 
2 Months  1 Year (48 weeks) 
+ 
ABCDE  ABCDE 
A  60  25  15  00  11  46  36  7  0 
B  5  75  18  2  0  8  47  38  8  0 
C  2  23  69  6  0  7  43  40  10  0 
D  2  2  31  65  0  6  36  43  15  0 
E  0  0  25  0  75  4  29  42  7  18 
3 Months  1 Year (48 weeks) 
+ 
ABCDE  ABCDE 
A  52  36  9  1  1  17  44  31  62 
B  11  67  20  2  0  13  43  36  7  2 
C  2  20  70  8  1  8  34  44  12  2 
D  1  4  29  61  5  6  24  44  22  5 
E  7  13  25  5  50  10  32  39  10  8 
~  ~~ 
4  Months  1 Year (48 weeks) 
+ 
ABCDE  ABCDE 
A  27  60  6  3  3  12  46  32  8  3 
B  13  57  26  3  0  10  44  37  7  2 
C  2  26  66  4  3  7  36  45  8  4 
D  0  10  29  54  7  4  25  41  24  7 
E  0  0  14  43  43  2  16  36  34  13 
ADL level. Less than half  were actually discharged on time, so there was 
considerable error for this category. 
The NCHSR study tried to minimize the problems of  measurement error 
(see Applied Management Sciences 1986, apps. 8-10).  Nurses were trained 
during a six-month baseline period before the study began. There were four 
types of tests used throughout the study to check reliability. In two of the tests, 
nurses assessed residents in pairs, either concurrently or successively. Also, 
thirty-three residents were videotaped while being assessed. These tapes were 
reviewed periodically to check agreement between nurses. These reliability 
studies give some idea of  the magnitude of the reporting error problem. 
This section adjusts the observed transition probabilities, given knowledge 
of  the measurement errors, to estimate the true transition probabilities P*. 
Following Poterba and Summers, we will estimate flows of  people, E  then 
convert the flows back to probabilities. Letx, andi, be the true and the ob- 
served numbers of people to go from state i to state j in a single period. Define 
Q to be the matrix of  error rates, where q,, = Pr(observed state = j I true 
state = i).  The estimated flows, E  depend on Q and F* as follows: 297  Markov Specification Tests 
r  - 
.95  .05  0  0  0 
.05  .90  .05  0  0 
Q  =  0  .025  .95  .025  0 
0  0  .05  .95  0 
-0  0  .10  0  1- 
. 
The matrix F was constructed from a three-month  probability  matrix, not 
directly from data on flows. It would be wrong to use the estimated two-week 
matrix for P  since the average time between observations is three months, and 
this  would  imply  misreporting  at  two-week  intervals.  Therefore,  we  use 
P  = P(2 week)6, estimated in Norton (1990). To  convert from probabilities 
7. The reader may wonder why Q was not defined in the obvious way to avoid taking inverses. 
Meyer (1988) compares these two methods and concludes that the second depends on a subtle but 
implausible assumption. 298  Edward C. Norton 
to flows, each column of the probability matrix was multiplied by a weighting 
vector of the probability distribution over the five types at admission. 
Unlike in Poterba and Summers, reporting errors seem to have little effect, 
as shown in table 9.17 compared to the corrected values in table 9.18. The 
matrices P*  and P differ by  a few percentage points in many cells, and in 
general the off-diagonal terms are smaller in P*. There is almost no differ- 
ence, though, in the length of stay and in the probability of ending in each of 
the absorbing states. The differences are much smaller than between the con- 
trol and the experimental groups. Even when the errors estimated in Q were 
increased dramatically, these basic results were unchanged. 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from these findings. Po- 
terba and Summers probably found larger effects because all their states were 
liable to be misclassified, while only four of  the nine nursing home states 
were. Furthermore, the major results, such as average length of stay and prob- 
ability of  ending in each absorbing state, are not very sensitive to measure- 
Table 9.17  Test of Measurement Error: Uncorrected Three-Month  Markov 
'kansition Matrix 
Next Period 
Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death  A  B  C  D  E 
~~  ~~~  ~  ~~~ 
A  17.3  10.4  12.0  2.5  31.0  21.0  4.5  .8  .5 
B  2.8  3.0  7.1  2.6  5.4  61.7  15.8  1.3  .2 
C  1.4  .9  7.5  5.1  .9  13.7  64.4  5.5  .6 
D  .9  .4  11.0  11.3  .4  2.1  17.2  54.6  2.2 
E  3.2  .3  18.0  23.3  1.6  4.3  10.9  3.2  35.2 
Length of  Stay 
Mean  Median 
A  3.7  2 
B  5.7  4 
C  5.9  4 
D  4.9  3 
E  3.2  2 
Probability That Person Starting in State Leaves 
Nursing Home in State 
Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death 
A  31  20  35  13 
B  17  15  45  22 
C  13  10  47  30 
D  8  6  46  39 
E  9  4  42  45 
Note: ICF = intermediate care facility. Hosp.  = hospitalization. 299  Markov Specification Tests 





Period  Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death  A  B  C  D  E 
A  17.3  10.4  12.0  2.5  33.9  19.3  3.3  .8  .5 
B  2.8  3.0  7.1  2.6  .4  71.7  11.2  .9  .2 
C  1.4  .9  7.5  5.1  .2  11.4  70.5  2.4  .6 
D  .9  .4  11.0  11.3  .3  1.5  12.6  59.8  2.3 
E  3.2  .3  18.0  23.3  1.5  4.3  11.0  3.0  35.2 
Length of Stay 
Mean  Median 
A  3.7  2 
B  6.2  5 
C  6.3  5 
D  4.9  3 
E  3.4  2 
~~ 
Probability That Person Starting in State Leaves 
Nursing Home in State 
Home  ICF  Hosp.  Death 
A  31  21  35  13 
B  15  15  46  23 
C  12  9  48  30 
D  7  5  47  41 
E  9  4  42  45 
Nore: ICF = intermediate care facility. Hosp.  = hospitalization. 
ment error within the nursing home. This would be different if nurses could 
not tell reliably whether a person had gone home or died. These results also 
put the conclusions of  section 9.1 in perspective. A quick calculation from 
table 9.7 shows that shifting 10 percent of  the sample would eliminate the 
effect that people return to their past state. Thus, about half the rebound effect 
found in the first-order section is probably due to measurement error. 
9.10  Conclusion 
This paper tested the assumptions of the simple Markov model on nursing 
home data and found that several tests failed. The model is not first order but 
second order. In particular, people tend to rebound to the state they were in 
last period more than a first-order model would predict. The Weibull model 
shows that there is strong negative duration dependence. Dividing the data 
into two parts shows that the nursing homes in the experimental group took 300  Edward C. Norton 
time to adjust to the reimbursement system. Finally, a test of the Markov as- 
sumption, as a general specification test, failed. 
Some tests supported  the  use of the simple model.  In a variety of tests, 
heterogeneity seemed to have weak effects. Thus, the increase in complexity 
by controlling for heterogeneity overshadows any gains in information. Cor- 
recting for measurement error has almost no effect on the average length of 
stay or on the probability of ending in the absorbing states, only small effects 
on transitions within the nursing home. In light of this, controlling for second- 
order effects does not  seem worthwhile,  especially since about half  the re- 
bound effect was due to measurement error.  Also,  the duration dependence 
that is so strong in Weibull models was not detected in a Markov model. Fi- 
nally, the fact that the nursing homes in the experimental group did not adjust 
instantly means that the results of the previous paper are underestimated. 
The Markov model should be viewed as a reasonable but imperfect model 
of  transitions  in  nursing  homes.  Research  in  this  area  could  benefit  from 
trying other kinds of duration models, such as competing hazard and semipar- 
ametric. These models may have advantages in speed of computation, a more 
flexible form, and an emphasis on duration and outcome that are important 
for public policy. 
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Comment  Sherwin Rosen 
This is a promising empirical analysis of whether monetary incentives affect 
the selection and length of stay of nursing home residents. Using data from a 
Medicaid experiment in San Diego, Edward C.  Norton finds that incentives 
apparently caused shorter lengths of  stay and more frequent admissions of 
patients in poorer health. These results are interesting but,  like all experi- 
ments, must be reenforced by replication in independent samples. 
The data description is somewhat confusing or incomplete. We  know that 
Medicaid finances nearly half of nursing home patients, but those reimburse- 
ments do not nearly cover average costs. To achieve financial viability, nursing 
homes with larger fractions of  Medicaid patients must either offer a lower 
quality of  service to Medicaid patients or cross-subsidize them by  charging 
non-Medicaid patients more. The experiment subsidized admissions of Med- 
icaid patients in worse states of  health and rewarded favorable outcomes in 
selected cases, but we are not told what proportions of all patients were cov- 
ered by  the schemes or indeed the relative frequency of  outcome and dis- 
charge bonus used in the experiment. A reader wants to know how important 
these  subsidies were  to  the  overall  operations of  experimental units  and 
whether the payments were large enough or frequent enough to have a plau- 
sible effect. Knowledge of the proportions of Medicaid and non-Medicaid pa- 
tients in the sample nursing homes might also be useful in assessing the gen- 
eral quality of  care in the sample. Quality of  care is known to vary among 
nursing homes, but the monetary incentives in the experiment were not con- 
ditioned on nursing home characteristics. If  lower-quality units were more 
eager to participate in the experiment, the results might be biased toward the 
null hypothesis. 
In assessing the results, it should also be borne in mind that the experimen- 
tal design did not satisfy some commonly accepted rules. In particular, there 
were no double-blind safeguards in  assigning patients to categories and in 
assessing outcomes. The same skilled nursing staff was employed for both. 
Complete double-blind safeguards are obviously impossible in experiments of 
this kind, but independent assessments of initial classifications and final out- 
comes would have made for a better experiment. And  since many of  these 
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assignments and assessments were done jointly by both the house staff and the 
experimental skilled nursing staff, there is potential bias if the classification 
criteria vary according to unobserved quality of care. Were the data available, 
it would be very interesting to examine the experience of non-Medicaid  pa- 
tients in both experimental and control group nursing homes. Using “within”- 
nursing home differences in patient types as well as “between”-experimental 
and control group nursing home differences in Medicare patients might help 
control for differences  in nursing home quality and possible  differential as- 
signment of cases among them. 
Studies of labor market and geographic mobility have found that identifying 
some agents as “stayers” and others as “movers” is necessary to fit the data. 
So many incomplete spell lengths make these distinctions more difficult to test 
in these data. Still, it must be noted that Norton’s estimates of mean and me- 
dian length of stay by category are based on manipulations of  the estimated 
transition  matrix,  not on direct observation, because many spells are still in 
progress at the end of the experiment. This is a limitation of the experiment, 
certainly not of Norton’s methodology, but it must in some sense increase the 
standard error of  estimated  experiment  effects.  If  in  addition  some of  the 
stayer-mover logic is applicable to nursing home residents, a resident’s initial 
state is not a sufficient statistic for probable future states. How persons arrive 
at that state affects the unconditional duration estimates, and those numbers 
(computed in tables 9.2 and 9.4) may not be accurate. One wonders why the 
observed assessment intervals of residents vary so much and whether they are 
behaviorally related to the mover-stayer (or permanent-temporary) assessment 
of a resident’s condition at the starting times. 
It can be argued that Medicare patients in nursing homes are a more homo- 
geneous  group in  the  above  sense  because  they  are likely  to  have  “spent 
down” any other insurance or private  resources in earlier hospitalization  or 
nursing home stays. Then these residents are more likely to be “stayers” (or 
permanent residents),  and the strict stationary, homogeneous Markov model 
may be a reasonable approximation. Knowledge of residents’ previous history 
would be very useful in assessing the importance of this point. But assuming 
it is true, by  what mechanism do these financial incentives  work to reduce 
turnover and length of  stay? Except for the patients initially assessed in state 
A, there are no substantial differences  in the sum of ultimate hospitalization 
and death probabilities between treatment and controls in tables 9.2 and 9.4. 
The main effects on spell length occur for persons in the better initial states. 
Perhaps this is as it should be. We  should not be subsidizing something that 
cannot occur. Yet insofar as these subsidies focus greater care and attention on 
the temporary residents, they promote a kind of adverse selection against the 
most difficult and costly (“permanent”) residents who may be in greatest need 
of care. We must assess these schemes not only in terms of the monetary costs 
to the Medicare system but also with regard to the values of  service among 303  Markov Specification Tests 
various classes of patients, including those for whom improvement and reha- 
bilitation is very unlikely. 
In using a flat fee reimbursement system independent of patient condition, 
the existing system promotes  adverse selection of the easier and less costly 
cases. The system investigated in the experiment does not factor in the costs 
of classifying or the potential abuses and moral hazard problems arising if the 
entire system were converted to the experimental reimbursement mechanism. 
The hothouse environment of the experiment does not produce any data what- 
soever on these latter costs, which may be substantial in any feasible system. 
These costs must be weighed against any efficiency gains in levels of care and 
lengths of stay that these financial incentives provide. This Page Intentionally Left Blank